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Abstract
Theories of how people learn relationships between continuous variables have tended to focus on
two possibilities: that people are estimating explicit functions, or that they are performing
associative learning supported by similarity. We provide a rational analysis of function learning,
drawing on work on regression in machine learning and statistics. Using the equivalence of
Bayesian linear regression and Gaussian processes, which provide a probabilistic basis for
similarity-based function learning, we show that learning explicit rules and using similarity can be
seen as two views of one solution to this problem. We use this insight to define a rational model of
human function learning that combines the strengths of both approaches and accounts for a wide
variety of experimental results.
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A rational model of function learning
Every time we get into a rental car, we have to learn how hard to press the gas pedal for a
given amount of acceleration. Solving this problem – which is an important part of driving safely –
requires learning a relationship between two continuous variables. Over the past fifty years, several
studies of function learning have shed light on how people come to understand continuous
relationships (Carroll, 1963; Brehmer, 1971, 1974; Koh & Meyer, 1991; Busemeyer, Byun,
DeLosh, & McDaniel, 1997; DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997; Kalish, Lewandowsky, &
Kruschke, 2004; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). It has become clear that people can learn and
recall a wide variety of relationships, but demonstrate certain systematic biases that tell us about the
mental representations and implicit assumptions that humans employ when solving function
learning problems. For example, people tend to expect that relationships will be linear when
extrapolating to novel examples (DeLosh et al., 1997), and find it more difficult to learn
relationships that change direction than those that do not (Brehmer, 1974; Byun, 1995).
Several models have been developed to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind function
learning. These models tend to fall into two different theoretical camps. The first includes
rule-based theories (e.g., Carroll, 1963; Brehmer, 1974; Koh & Meyer, 1991), which suggest that
people learn an explicit function from a given family, such as polynomials (Carroll, 1963;
McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005) or power-law functions (Koh & Meyer, 1991). This approach
attributes rich representations to human learners, but has traditionally given limited treatment to
how such representations could be acquired. A second approach includes similarity-based
theories (e.g., DeLosh et al., 1997; Busemeyer et al., 1997), which focus on the idea that people
learn by forming associations: if x is used to predict y, observations with similar x values should
also have similar y values. This approach can be straightforwardly implemented in a connectionist
architecture and thus gives an account of the underlying learning mechanisms, but faces challenges
in explaining how people generalize so broadly beyond their experience. Most recently, hybrids of
these two approaches have been proposed (e.g., Kalish et al., 2004; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005),
with an associative learning process that acts on explicitly-represented functions.
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Almost all past research on computational models of function learning has been oriented
towards understanding the psychological processes that underlie human performance, or the steps
by which people update and deploy their mental representations of continuous relationships. In this
paper, we take a different approach, presenting a rational analysis of function learning in the spirit
of Anderson (1990), Marr (1982), and Shepard (1987). Specifically, we start with an abstract
representation of the problem to be solved and a handful of additional assumptions about the nature
of continuous relationships, and then explore optimal solutions to the problem in light of these
assumptions with the goal of shedding light on human behavior. This rational analysis provides a
way to understand the relationship between the rule- and similarity-based approaches that have
dominated previous work and suggest how they might be combined. Whereas hybrid models apply
similarity-based learning to explicit rules, we offer a single foundation that supports both
approaches, using a common set of commitments about learning and representation.
To understand the abstract problem that a function learner faces, we can turn to machine
learning and statistics, where prediction in continuous domains – a problem familiarly known as
regression – has been studied extensively. There are a variety of solutions to regression problems,
but we focus on methods related to Bayesian linear regression (e.g., Bernardo & Smith, 1994),
which allow us to make and test explicit claims about learners’ expectations, using probability
distributions. Bayesian linear regression is also directly related to a nonparametric approach known
as Gaussian process prediction (e.g., Williams, 1998), in which predictions about the values of an
output variable are based on the similarity between values of an input variable. We use this
relationship to connect the two traditional approaches to modeling function learning, as it shows
that learning rules that describe functions and specifying the similarity between stimuli for use in
associative learning are not mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather two views of the same
solution. We exploit this fact to define a rational model of human function learning that
incorporates the strengths of both approaches.
The plan of this paper is as follows. First, we review several sets of empirical phenomena in
function learning, both to provide background and to establish criteria by which different theories
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of function learning can be judged. We then review past models of function learning, dividing them
into rule-based, similarity-based, and hybrid approaches. Next, we introduce a new perspective on
function learning in which rules and similarity can be expressed in a common framework, and
describe a model that follows from this perspective. Finally, we evaluate different variations on our
model against one another and previous models.
Phenomena in function learning
Past studies have taken diverse approaches to understanding how people learn relationships
between continuous variables, but we will focus on four kinds of empirical phenomena that have
been used in previous tests of function learning models (e.g., McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005), or
explicitly measure what kinds of relationships people implicitly believe to be more or less
likely (Kalish, Griffiths, & Lewandowsky, 2007), or challenge many models of function
learning (Kalish et al., 2004). Our decision to focus on the following phenomena is also motivated
by their being relatively comparable, coming from similar experimental designs involving
randomly-ordered, sequentially presented training stimuli, in the absence of informative cover
stories or contextual information. In this section, we review these four kinds of phenomena, which
we will later use to evaluate our own approach to explaining and understanding function learning.
Interpolation and learning difficulty
Some kinds of relationships are easier to learn than others. For example, increasing linear
relationships tend to be easier to learn than decreasing linear relationships (Brehmer, 1971, 1976).
Similarly, linear relationships are typically easier to learn than non-linear ones (Brehmer, 1974;
Brehmer, Alm, & Warg, 1985; Byun, 1995; see Koh & Meyer, 1991 for a possible counterexample).
Among non-linear relationships, people have more difficulty learning those that change
direction (Brehmer, 1974; Brehmer et al., 1985; Byun, 1995). Cyclic relationships are especially
difficult – but not impossible – to learn (Bott & Heit, 2004; Byun, 1995; Kalish, 2013). These
systematic differences suggests that some relationships are subjectively simpler, more common, or
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 6
more straightforwardly represented than others, and the patterns given above dovetail with explicit
human judgments about the probabilities of different kinds of relationships (Brehmer, 1974).
If the difficulty of learning a relationship reflects its mental representation, one can evaluate a
model of function learning by comparing its average error rates to those of humans across several
kinds of relationships. More precisely, if one orders several relationships by the average magnitude
of errors that humans make when predicting y for x values that fall between past examples, i.e.,
interpolating, a good model should show the same ordering in its prediction error. For humans,
these errors are influenced by many factors, such as the match or mismatch of cover stories to the
available data, the number of training points, and presentation order (Byun, 1995), but we will
focus on properties of the relationships themselves, which provide a simple basis for evaluating
different theories of function learning. For instance, relationships in which y increases as a function
of x tend to be easier to learn than functions in which y decreases as a function of x, which are in
turn easier to learn than non-monotonic functions. For a summary of some qualitative properties of
functions that contribute to differential learning difficulty for humans, see Busemeyer et al. (1997).
In our own evaluation, we will use data from several studies that were gathered by McDaniel and
Busemeyer (2005) and are summarized in Table 1.
Extrapolation
Studies that measure interpolation errors allow relationships to be ranked by how easy they
are to learn, with implications for those relationships’ subjective probability and consistency with
humans’ mental representations. Unfortunately, quite different models can show similar patterns of
errors (given a limited set of relationship types) which constrains the amount one can learn from
this approach. This and other limitations of interpolation-error studies have led some researchers to
focus on how people extrapolate, or make judgments about points that are distant from those seen
before. This approach gives a greater share of influence to learners’ prior beliefs, and makes it
possible to uncover patterns that are not reflected in interpolation error rates. To date,
extrapolation-based studies of function learning are comparatively sparse, but have revealed several
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 7
biases in human learners. For example, people’s extrapolation judgments follow linear
patterns (DeLosh et al., 1997, but see Kalish et al., 2004), and more specifically tend toward
functions with a positive slope and an intercept of zero (Kwantes & Neal, 2006). In one instance of
this bias, when people are trained using data from a quadratic function, their average predictions
fall between the true function and straight lines fitted to the closest training points.
Learning multiple relationships
The term “function learning” suggests that relationships between continuous variables – or at
least the representations that people form of them – are functions, in that for a given value of the
predictor x, there is a single valid prediction, or at least a range of predictions with a single
most-likely value or mode. In reality, this is not always the case. For example, dose responses for
drugs might have two or more patterns, depending on unobserved genetic factors or patient
histories, and some hybrid cars have different relationships between pressure on the accelerator and
the car’s real acceleration, depending on whether or not the combustion engine is active. The world
abounds with hidden mediators that can change the relationship between observable variables, and
one might expect humans to be able to make judgments that reflect the presence of multiple
underlying relationships. Consistent with this intuition, Lewandowsky, Kalish and Ngang (2002)
found that fire fighters learn two distinct relationships between wind speed, ground slope, and the
rate at which a fire spreads, depending on whether the fire is labeled as a standard forest fire, or a
“back burn” fire set to mitigate damage from future fires. Lewandowsky et al. refer to this
phenomenon as “knowledge partitioning”, based on the idea that participants’ knowledge of the
relationship at hand is partitioned into distinct subsets based on context.
More recently, Kalish, Lewandowsky and Krushke (2004) conducted three experiments
showing that people make judgments that demonstrate an implicit belief in the presence of multiple
overlapping linear relationships, even when no contextual information was present, and in
circumstances where the training data could be explained using a single non-linear relationship (see
Figure 1 for examples).
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Figure 1. Training data and four participants’ judgments for Experiments 1-3 in Kalish et al. (2004).
Predictor variable values are plotted on the x-axes, with predicted variable values plotted on the
y-axes.
Iterated learning
Iterated learning is an experimental method that was first developed for studying language
evolution (Kirby, 2001), but it has more recently been applied to other phenomena, including
function learning. In an iterated learning experiment, there are chains of learners where the first
learner in each chain receives data, makes some inference on the basis of those data, and uses that
inference to provide new data to the next learner in the chain. The data produced by each learner is
the product of the data he or she receives and his or her inductive biases or expectations about the
underlying relationship, item, or event. As the chain of learners grows longer, the influence of the
learners’ shared expectations eventually washes out the information carried by the data provided to
the first learner. After enough iterations, the data carried forward in the chain reflect human
expectations about what relationships are likely, rather than the data the first learner in the chain
sees, providing useful information about how people represent and reason about the phenomena at
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Figure 2. Plots of results from Kalish et al. (2007). (A) Positive linear initial data; (B) Negative
linear initial data; (C) U-shaped initial data; (D) Random initial data.
hand (Kalish et al., 2007).
Figure 2 shows the results of a set of iterated function learning experiments conducted by
Kalish et al. (2007). There were four conditions that differed in what data were given to the first
participants in the chains. The positive linear (A) chains started with a linear relationship with a
slope of one and an intercept of zero, the negative linear (B) chains started with a linear
relationship with a slope of negative one and an intercept of zero, the U-shaped (C) chains started
with data from a U-shaped relationship, and the random (D) chains started with a disorganized
collection of points without any apparent underlying regularity. Kalish et al. (2007) found that the
judgments of later participants tended to converge to a positive linear relationship with a slope of
one and an intercept of zero regardless of the initial data. While these convergence results dovetail
with past findings indicating that positive linear relationships are easier to learn, the intermediate
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states of the chains provide a more detailed view of function learning. For example, learners tended
to preserve negative linear relationships, consistent with the idea that people think these
relationships are likely or plausible. Further, many learners were quick to infer the presence of
multiple overlapping relationships, as when some participants interpreted noisy data as evidence for
a negative linear relationship superimposed on a positive one.
Models of human function learning
The phenomena described in the previous section have inspired several theories and models
of function learning, which can be organized into three classes: those based on rules or explicit
functions, those based on associative or similarity-based learning, and hybrids that use explicit
representations and associative learning. In this section, we review each class in turn, before
discussing the extent to which each is consistent with the empirical results described above.
Representing functions with rules
Some of the earliest research into function learning postulates that people learn continuous
relationships using explicitly-represented functions (Carroll, 1963). Carroll proposed that people
assume a particular class of functions (such as polynomials of degree k) and use the available
observations to estimate the parameters of those functions. The resulting representation allows
people to generalize beyond the observed values of the variables involved. Consistent with the
version of this hypothesis that Carroll advanced, people learned linear and quadratic functions
better than random pairings of values for two variables, and extrapolated appropriately. Similar
assumptions have guided subsequent work, which has explored the ease with which people learn
different kinds of functions (e.g., Brehmer, 1974), and examined how well human responses are
described by different forms of nonlinear regression (e.g., Koh & Meyer, 1991).
The advent of rule-based models precedes most of empirical results we consider, so it may be
unsurprising that these models face some difficulty in explaining those results. Rule-based models
do not show the flexibility in interpolation that human learners exhibit, and tend not to predict the
order-of-difficulty found in interpolation studies (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). Similarly, there
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is evidence that rule-based models (such as Koh & Meyer, 1991) make extrapolation predictions
that diverge from human judgments (DeLosh et al., 1997). Purely rule-based models make no
provision for multiple overlapping relationships, and thus cannot account for knowledge
partitioning effects (Kalish et al., 2004). By extension, their ability to explain Kalish, Griffiths, and
Lewandowsky’s (2007) iterated learning results is limited: while rule-based models might be able
to explain long-run convergence to positive linear relationships, they do not anticipate participants’
multimodal judgments.
Similarity and associative learning
Associative learning models propose that people do not learn relationships between
continuous variables by explicitly learning rules, but instead forge associations between observed
events and generalize based on the similarity of new variable values to old. The first model to
implement this approach was the Associative Learning Model (ALM; DeLosh et al., 1997;
Busemeyer et al., 1997), in which input and output arrays are used to represent a range of values for
the variables between which the functional relationship holds. Presentation of an input activates
input nodes close to that value, with activation falling off as a Gaussian function of distance,
implementing a theory of similarity in the input space.
Learned weights determine the activation of the output nodes, which is a linear function of
the activation of the input nodes. Weights are learned by gradient descent, where the local
relationship between weights and errors is used to find new weights that reduce the squared error of
the model’s predictions. This process is repeated until the error can no longer be reduced. In
practice, this approach performs well when interpolating between observed values, but poorly when
extrapolating beyond those values, as it does not capture humans’ ability to extrapolate in
systematic, structured ways. As a consequence, Delosh et al. introduced the EXAM model, which
constructs a linear approximation to the output of the ALM when selecting responses.
Similarity-based models have seen mixed success in explaining the range of empirical
phenomena we describe above. In studies of interpolation and learning difficulty, similarity-based
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models show similar patterns of interpolation errors to those of humans (McDaniel & Busemeyer,
2005). In the context of extrapolation, ALM does not address extrapolation but EXAM was
developed with those results in mind and effectively captures the human bias toward linearity and
predicts human extrapolations over a variety of relationships (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005), but
without accounting for the human capacity for non-linear extrapolation (Bott & Heit, 2004). Like
rule-based models, similarity-based models make unimodal predictions for any given x, and thus
fail to account for knowledge partitioning results. This limitation also prevents EXAM from
capturing some of the intermediate patterns that people produce in the iterated learning experiment.
Hybrid approaches
Several studies have explored methods for combining rule-like representations of functions
with associative learning. One example of such an approach is the set of models explored in
McDaniel and Busemeyer (2005). These models used the same kind of input representation as
ALM and EXAM, with activation of a set of nodes similar to the input value. However, the models
also feature a set of hidden units, where each hidden unit corresponds to a different
parameterization of a rule from a given class, including polynomial, Fourier, and logistic functions.
The values of the hidden units – corresponding to the values of the rules they instantiate – are
combined linearly to obtain output predictions, with the weight of each hidden node being learned
through gradient descent .
Another instance of a hybrid approach is the POLE model (Kalish et al., 2004), in which
hidden units represent different linear functions and the weights from inputs to hidden nodes
indicate which linear function should be used to make predictions for particular input values. Using
this representation, the model can learn non-linear functions by identifying a series of local linear
approximations, and can even model situations in which people seem to learn different functions in
different parts of the input space. As a result, it is unique among the models we have discussed in
its ability to match the bimodal response distributions discovered by Kalish et al. (2004).
Hybrid rule- and similarity-based models form a more heterogenous group than similarity-
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and ruled-based models, with representatives including POLE (Kalish et al., 2004) and McDaniel
and Busemeyer’s (2005) connectionist implementations of rule-based models. POLE is set apart
from the other models we have discussed by its ability to capture knowledge partitioning effects
and it demonstrates a similar ordering of error rates to those of human learners (McDaniel,
Dimperio, Griego, & Busemeyer, 2009). In its extrapolation predictions, however, there is evidence
that it deviates from human performance (McDaniel et al., 2009). In an iterated learning design,
POLE showed both convergence to positive linear relationships and some of the qualitative patterns
that human learners demonstrate (depicted in Figure 3II), including transitional states with
overlapping positive and negative linear relationships. McDaniel and Busemeyer’s hybrid
polynomial model – which performed better than the alternative hybrid models they considered –
demonstrates an ordering of interpolation errors on different functions that aligns only roughly with
human judgments (see Table 1), but its extrapolation predictions are consistent with human
judgments from McDaniel and Busemeyer’s studies (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). Like
rule-based models, this model offers unimodal predictions, and thus cannot account for knowledge
partitioning phenomena, and has not been evaluated against iterated learning results.
Summary
We have reviewed a diverse set of models that accurately predict a variety of empirical
phenomena in function learning. Despite their different commitments about how humans learn
continuous relationships, a common theme of these models is an emphasis on the process by which
function learning occurs. In the next section, we will take a fundamentally different view, focusing
on the abstract problem of function learning and the forms that good solutions to that problem
should take, rather than the process. This view complements past models rather than supplanting
them, and we will demonstrate that it provides a common framework with which to understand and
unify rule- and similarity-based approaches.
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Figure 3. Model predictions for iterated learning data. A-D denote positive linear, negative linear,
U-shaped, and random initial data, respectively. (I) Predictions from EXAM; (II) Predictions from
POLE; (III) Mean function estimates from Model 3, removing noise.
Rational solutions to regression problems
The models outlined in the previous section all aim to describe the psychological processes
involved in human function learning. In this section, we consider the abstract computational
problem underlying this task, using optimal solutions to this problem to shed light on both previous
models and human learning. Viewed abstractly, the computational problem behind function
learning is to use a set of real-valued observations xn = (x1, ..., xn) and tn = (t1, ..., tn), to predict
what yn+1 goes with a new xn+1. Here, the y-values correspond to the underlying relationship, and
the t-values are observations of y that have been obscured by additive noise, so yn+1 = E[tn+1].
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Following much of the literature on human function learning, we consider only one-dimensional
relationships, but this approach generalizes naturally to the multi-dimensional case. In machine
learning and statistics, this is referred to as a regression problem. In this section, we discuss how
regression problems can be solved using Bayesian statistics, and how the result of this approach is
related to Gaussian processes, a formalism with close ties to associative learning. Our presentation
follows that in Williams (1998). See Appendix A for a more thorough treatment of the
mathematical details.
Bayesian linear regression
Ideally, we would seek to solve our regression problem by using not just the observations of
x and t, but some prior beliefs about the probability of encountering different kinds of functions
f(·) in the world. We can do this by applying Bayes’ rule, with
p(f |xn, tn) = p(tn|f,xn)p(f)∫
F p(tn|f,xn)p(f)df
. (1)
Knowledge of which functions in the space of possibilities F are more likely to be the true function
is captured by p(f), the prior distribution. The probability of observing the values of tn if f were
the true function is given by the likelihood function p(tn|f,xn), and the probability that f is the
true function given the observations xn and tn is the posterior distribution p(f |xn, tn). In most
regression models, the likelihood is defined by assuming that any deviation from the true function is
due to many independent sources of noise – more specifically, that ti is Gaussian with mean
yi = f(xi) and variance σ2t . Predictions about the value of the function f for a new input xn+1 can
be made by integrating over all functions in the posterior distribution,
p(yn+1|xn+1, tn,xn) =
∫
f
p(yn+1|f, xn+1)p(f |xn, tn)df (2)
where p(yn+1|f, xn+1) is a delta function placing all of its mass on yn+1 = f(xn+1). Performing
the integration outlined above can be challenging, but it becomes straightforward if we limit the
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hypothesis space to certain specific classes of functions. If we take F to be all linear functions of
the form y = b0 + xb1, then our problem takes the familiar form of linear regression. To perform
Bayesian linear regression, we need to define a prior p(f) over all linear functions. Since these
functions are identified by the parameters b0 and b1, it is sufficient to define a prior over
b = (b0, b1), which we can do by assuming that b follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
which results in a posterior distribution over b that is also a multivariate Gaussian (see Bernardo &
Smith, 1994). Linear transformations of Gaussian distributions are also Gaussian, so the predictive
density (Equation 2) is also Gaussian, and the noise introduced between true values t and
observations y simply adds to the variance of this distribution.
While considering only linear functions might seem overly restrictive, linear regression
actually gives us the basic tools we need to solve this problem for more general classes of functions.
Many classes of functions can be described as linear combinations of a small set of basis functions.
For example, all kth degree polynomials are linear combinations of functions of the form 1 (the
constant function), x, x2, ..., xk. Letting φ(1), ..., φ(k) denote a set of functions, we can define a
prior on the class of functions that are linear combinations of this basis by expressing such functions
in the form f(x) = b0 + φ(1)(x)b1 + ...+ φ(k)(x)bk and defining a prior on the vector of weights b.
As long as the prior over weights is Gaussian, the same results apply as in the simple linear case.
Gaussian processes
Another approach to regression problems is to forgo any explicit representation of the
underlying function and focus on making predictions. If our goal is merely to predict yn+1 using
xn+1, tn, and xn, we might simply define a joint distribution on tn+1 given xn+1 and find its
expected value, which is equal to yn+1, after conditioning on tn:
p(tn+1|xn+1,xn, tn) = p(tn+1|xn+1,xn)
p(tn|xn+1,xn) . (3)
This equation expresses the problem of regression in very general terms, and may, at first glance,
seem daunting to compute: it involves defining a joint distribution over all of the points observed so
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 17
far, as well as the joint distribution including the new, unknown point. Further, if we want to predict
yn+1, we must be able to take the expectation of this quotient. However, in some circumstances, the
probability of tn+1 given xn+1, xn, and tn has a straightforward analytical solution, and an easily
computed expectation. One such case, which will be our focus here, is when all tn+1 values are
jointly Gaussian. In other words, tn+1 is distributed according to a single multivariate Gaussian,
with dimensionality corresponding to the number of points under consideration. This is determined
by its mean and covariance matrix, and once these are specified, we have a solution for Equation 3:
the quotient has a closed form for multivariate Gaussians (see Rasmussen & Williams, 2006, for
details). As we will see, assuming a jointly Gaussian distribution is not a strong constraint, and we
can express a very broad set of relationships through our choice of means and covariances.
Both the mean vector and the covariance matrix are determined by the values of x. Broadly
speaking, the mean vector captures expectations about how the function looks in the absence of
data, and the covariance matrix – or the kernel function that generates it – captures expectations
about how points relate to one another. The covariance matrix entry for any pair of t-values (ti, tj)
is given by a function K(xi,xj), plus a diagonal matrix capturing the noisy relationship between
the underlying values yi and the observations ti. we can Using this covariance matrix, we can
obtain the distribution of tn+1 conditional on tn. The function K(·, ·), called the kernel function,
can be chosen arbitrarily as long as the covariance matrix it produces is valid.
One common kind of kernel is a radial basis function, e.g.,
K(xi, xj) = θ21 exp(−
1
θ22
(xi − xj)2) (4)
which leads to t values that are more strongly correlated when their corresponding x values are
more similar, with the parameters θ1 and θ2 determining how quickly the correlation falls off as
differences in x values increase. Other kernels are possible, including periodic functions such as
K(xi, xj) = θ23 exp(θ24(cos(
2pi
θ5
[xi − xj]))) (5)
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indicating that values of y for which values of x are close relative to the period θ3 are likely to be
highly correlated.
This approach to prediction, in which a kernel function applied to x defines a normal
distribution on t-values, is called a Gaussian process. A wide variety of kernel functions are
possible, corresponding to varied commitments about which x values are likely to lead to similar
t-values, making Gaussian processes a flexible way to solve regression problems.
Two views of regression
Bayesian linear regression and Gaussian processes appear to be quite different approaches. In
Bayesian linear regression, a hypothesis space of functions is identified, a prior on that space is
defined, and predictions are formed by averaging over the posterior distribution of y, while
Gaussian processes simply use the similarity between different values of x, as expressed through a
kernel, to predict correlations in values of y. It might thus come as a surprise that these approaches
are equivalent.
Showing that Bayesian linear regression corresponds to Gaussian process prediction is
straightforward. The assumption of linearity means that the vector yn+1 is equal to Xn+1b. Given
normally distributed weights, it follows that p(yn+1|xn+1) is a multivariate Gaussian distribution
with mean zero and covariance matrix Xn+1ΣbXTn+1. Bayesian linear regression thus corresponds
to prediction using Gaussian processes, with this covariance matrix playing the role of Kn+1 above
(i.e., using the kernel function K(xi, xj) = [1 xi][1 xj]T ). Using a richer set of basis functions
corresponds to taking Kn+1 = Φn+1ΣbΦTn+1, i.e.,
K(xi, xj) = [1 φ(1)(xi) . . . φ(k)(xi)][1 φ(1)(xi) . . . φ(k)(xi)]T , (6)
where φ(1...k) are k arbitrary functions of x (Williams, 1998). It is also possible to show that
Gaussian process prediction can always be interpreted as Bayesian linear regression, albeit with a
potentially infinite number of basis functions. Just as we can express a covariance matrix in terms
of its eigenvectors and eigenvalues, we can express a given kernel K(xi, xj) in terms of its
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eigenfunctions φ and eigenvalues λ, with
K(xi, xj) =
∞∑
k=1
λkφ
(k)(xi)φ(k)(xj) (7)
for any xi and xj (Minh, Niyogi, & Yao, 2006). Thus, any kernel can be viewed as the result of
performing Bayesian linear regression with a set of basis functions corresponding to its
eigenfunctions, and a prior with covariance matrix Σb = diag(λ).
These results establish an important duality between Bayesian linear regression and Gaussian
processes: for every prior on functions, there exists a corresponding kernel, and for every kernel,
there exists a corresponding prior on functions. Bayesian linear regression and prediction with
Gaussian processes are thus just two views of the same solution to regression problems.
Combining rules and similarity through Gaussian processes
The results outlined in the previous section suggest that, in the context of regression, learning
using rules – as expressed in a Bayesian linear regression model – and generalizing based on
similarity – as expressed in a Gaussian process’s kernel function – are mutually compatible points
of view. In this section, we briefly describe how previous accounts of function learning connect to
these statistical models, and then use this insight to define a model of human function learning that
combines the strengths of both approaches.
Reinterpreting previous accounts of human function learning
That idea of human function learning as a kind of statistical regression connects directly to
Bayesian linear regression. Many rule-based models (e.g., Koh & Meyer, 1991; Carroll, 1963) can
be framed in terms Bayesian linear regression while retaining all of their basic commitments and
predictions. Similarly, the basic ideas behind Gaussian process regression (with a standard
radial-basis kernel function) lie at the heart of similarity-based models such as ALM. In particular,
ALM and the associative-learning component of EXAM implement cubic spline
approximation (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005), which can be represented using Gaussian
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processes (Rasmussen & Williams, 2006). Similarly, neural network approaches to similarity-based
generalization are directly related to Gaussian processes, with some networks having a perfect
mapping to a corresponding Gaussian process (Neal, 1994). Gaussian processes with radial-basis
kernels can thus be viewed as implementing a simple kind of similarity-based generalization,
predicting similar y values for stimuli with similar x values. The hybrid approach to rule learning
taken by McDaniel and Busemeyer (2005) is also closely related to Bayesian linear regression. The
rules represented by the hidden units serve as a basis set that specifies a class of functions, and
applying penalized gradient descent on the weights assigned to those basis elements serves as an
online algorithm for finding the function with highest posterior probability (MacKay, 1995).
Mixing functions in a Gaussian process model
The relationship between Gaussian processes and Bayesian linear regression suggests that we
can define a single model that exploits both similarity and rules in forming predictions. We can do
this by choosing a hypothesis space that covers a broad class of functions, including both those
consistent with a radial basis kernel and those taking simple parametric forms. This is equivalent to
modeling y as being produced by a Gaussian process with a kernel corresponding to one of a small
number of types. Specifically, we assume that observations are generated by a function that is linear
with positive slope, linear with negative slope, quadratic, or nonlinear but generally smooth.
Figure 4 depicts samples from these individual kernels. This combination is one way to express the
total prior over functions in Equations 1 and 2, with p(f) = ∑k p(f |k)P (k), where k represents a
particular kernel in the set of four we have mentioned. For examples of functions that are likely
under each of the different kernels, see Figure 4.
We do not claim that the specific kernels compose an exhaustive account of the relationships
that people and learn and extrapolate from. Rather, we believe that people find these relationships
especially easy to learn, and especially plausible or likely as explanations of data in the face of
uncertainty, based on the results of Brehmer (1971), DeLosh et al. (1997) and Kalish et al. (2007).
A more complete account would include kernels that permit a wide variety of extrapolation
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Figure 4. Samples from the four kernels that are combined in our models, reflecting the kind of
relationship that each kernel favors.
patterns (e.g., Bott & Heit, 2004), but for the data we will consider such an expansion would add to
the complexity of our models without substantially changing our predictions (see Lucas, Sterling,
and Kemp (2012) for a demonstration of how Gaussian process models can be used to predict a
variety of non-linear extrapolations). The probabilities of the different relationship types are defined
by the vector pi. The relevant kernels are introduced in the previous sections (where “Nonlinear”
corresponds to the radial basis kernel), with the positive and negative kernels having different
means in their distributions over weights b, taking mean intercepts and slopes of [0 1], [1 −1]
respectively. Using this Gaussian process model allows a learner to simultaneously make inferences
about the overall type and specific form of the function from which their observations are drawn.
In developing this kind of model and selecting this particular set of priors – reflected in our
choice of kernel functions – we are making explicit commitments about the inductive biases that
shape human function learning. These include what types of relationships are more subjectively
probable than others, and the more specific forms that relationships of a given type are likely to
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take. Our model does not, however, commit to any specific process by which those biases shape
people’s inferences, which might resemble, for example, the associative mechanisms present in
POLE or EXAM or an elaboration the hypothesis-testing framework offered by Brehmer.1
Basic tests of the Gaussian process model
In the remainder of the paper, we will evaluate our Gaussian process approach to function
learning using each of the empirical phenomena we discussed earlier. First, following the approach
taken in McDaniel and Busemeyer’s (2005) review of computational models of function learning,
we look at two quantitative tests of Gaussian processes as an account of human function learning:
reproducing the order of difficulty of learning functions of different types, and extrapolation
performance. As indicated earlier, there is a large literature consisting of both models and data
concerning human function learning, and these simulations are intended to demonstrate the
potential of the Gaussian process model rather than to provide an exhaustive test of its performance.
See Appendix B for a summary of the parameters in our model, and Appendix C for a description
of the procedures used to generate model predictions.
Difficulty of learning
As discussed above, one important measure of a theory of human function learning is its
ability to account for the relative difficulty people have in learning different kinds of relationships.
Table 1 is an augmented version of results presented in (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005) which
compared several models’ prediction errors to humans’ errors when learning a range of functions.
Each entry in the table is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of human or model responses from
the actual value of the function, evaluated over the stimuli presented in training. The MAD
provides a measure of how difficult it is for people or a given model to learn a function. The data
reported for each set of studies are ordered by increasing MAD (corresponding to increasing
1In obtaining predictions from our model, we use sampling methods that are described in Appendix C. There has been
recent work supporting the idea that sampling may explain the inferences that humans make in many domains (Griffiths,
Vul, & Sanborn, 2012), but our predictions are not coupled to any inference procedure and we do not have data
distinguishing between different mechanistic or implementation-level accounts.
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difficulty). In addition to reproducing the MAD for the models in (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005),
the table has been expanded to contain the MADs exhibited by seven Gaussian process (GP)
models trained on the target functions.
The seven GP models incorporated different collections of kernel functions by adjusting their
prior probabilities. The most comprehensive model includes the
{Positive Linear,Negative Linear,Quadratic,Nonlinear} set of kernel functions, assigning them
prior probabilities proportional to 8, 1, 0.1, and 0.01, respectively.2 Six other GP models were
examined by assigning certain kernel functions zero prior probability and re-normalizing the
remainder so that the prior probabilities summed to one. The seven distinct GP models are
presented in Table 1 are labeled by the kernel functions to which they assign non-zero probability,
under the header “Model 1”. Models 2 and 3, which are extensions that account for knowledge
partitioning phenomena, are discussed below. The kernels include Linear (including both positive
and negative linear functions), Quadratic (second-order polynomial functions), RBF (nonlinear
relationships, fit by a radial basis function kernel), LQ (linear and quadratic), LR (linear and RBF),
QR (quadratic and RBF), and LRQ (linear, quadratic, and RBF). The MAD for each function from
McDaniel and Busemeyer (2005) is reported for each model in Table 1, along with human MADs.
The last three rows of Table 1 give the correlations between human and model performance across
functions, expressing quantitatively how well each model captured the pattern of human function
learning behavior. All of the GP models perform well, with every model (except for the Linear and
LQ models) providing a closer match to the human data than any of the models considered by
McDaniel and Busemeyer (2005).
Extrapolation performance
Predicting and explaining people’s capacity for extrapolation to novel stimuli is another key
criterion for judging models of function learning. In Table 2, we compare mean human predictions
for linear, exponential, and quadratic functions (from DeLosh et al., 1997) to those of several
2The selection of these values was guided by results indicating the order of difficulty of learning functions of these
different types for human learners, but we did not optimize pi with respect to the criteria reported here.
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models described in McDaniel and Busemeyer (2005), as well as each of the Gaussian process
models we describe above and two model extensions that we will describe below. While none of
the GP models produce quite as high a correlation as EXAM on all three functions, all but the
Linear and LR models make predictions that correspond closely with human judgments. It is
notable that this performance is achieved with the same parameters that were used for the difficulty
of learning data (see Appendix B for details), while the predictions of EXAM were the result of
optimizing two parameters for each of the three functions.
Figure 5 displays mean human judgments for each of the three functions, along with the
predictions of an extended Gaussian process model we discuss below, which incorporates Linear,
Quadratic, and Nonlinear kernel functions. The regions to the left and right of the solid black lines
represent extrapolation regions, containing input values for which neither people nor the model
were trained. Both people and the model extrapolate nearly optimally on the linear function, and
reasonably accurately for the exponential and quadratic function. However, there is a bias towards a
linear slope in the extrapolation of the exponential and quadratic functions, with extreme values of
the quadratic and exponential function being overestimated. Quantitative measures of extrapolation
performance are shown in Table 2, which gives the correlation between human and model
predictions for EXAM (DeLosh et al., 1997; Busemeyer et al., 1997) and the seven GP models.
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Figure 5. Extrapolation performance, with mean predictions on linear, exponential, and quadratic
functions for human participants from Delosh, Busemeyer and McDaniel (1997) and a mixture of
Gaussian process experts (Model 3; see text). Training data were presented in the region spanned
by a solid black line, , and extrapolation performance was evaluated outside this region, with the
true function represented by dashed lines.
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Table 2
Linear Correlations Between Human and Model Predictions for Extrapolation Regions.
Model Linear Exponential Quadratic
EXAM .999 .997 .961
Model 1, Linear .996 .972 .277
Model 1, Quadratic .986 .973 .921
Model 1, RBF .996 .989 .921
Model 1, LQ .996 .972 .942
Model 1, LR .996 .972 .363
Model 1, RQ .985 .967 .941
Model 1, LRQ .996 .971 .513
Model 2 .996 .981 .955
Model 3 .996 .982 .957
Note: Gaussian process models with multiple kernels are denoted as in Table 1.
Summary
We have shown that our model accounts well for the relative difficulty with which people
learn different kinds of relationships, and how they extrapolate from limited training data. More
complex phenomena, such as knowledge partitioning and the multiple overlapping relationships it
entails, require more complex models. The next section addresses these phenomena, and describes
a straightforward extension of our Gaussian process model to accommodate the possibility of
multiple relationships while still explaining human interpolation and extrapolation behavior.
Extending the Gaussian process model beyond single relationships
In most models of function learning, including the Gaussian process-based models described
above, it is assumed that people learn a single relationship between a variable and its predictors.
There might be a complex, non-linear relationship between x and f(x), but for a single value of x,
f(x) is always unimodal and relationships are never compositions of other relationships. We have
mentioned that this assumption fails to describe many real relationships, and, as knowledge
partitioning results show, it also fails to explain human behavior.
Of the models we have described, only the POLE model (Kalish et al., 2004) makes
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predictions that are consistent with knowledge partitioning phenomena, doing so by appealing to
the mental representations and processes people use when learning functions. We will show that a
rational analysis of function learning leads to a similar set of predictions. In many real-world
situations, two variables x and y will relate to one another in different ways, depending on context.
If y depends on w in addition to x, i.e., the true function is y = f(x,w), and w is not observable,
the apparent relationship between x and y may have discontinuities, and it may not be a function at
all, having multiple values of y for a given x . We previously discussed examples of such
relationships, including acceleration in hybrid cars and dose-response curves in a patient population.
Other examples of hidden mediators include the relationship between brake pressure and
acceleration, mediated by surface slipperiness, and the relationship between the temperature of a
material and its malleability, mediated by its unobserved crystal structure, as with the temper of a
piece of metal. With these intuitions in hand, we will now describe how our model may be
extended to reflect them.
Mixtures of Gaussian process experts
We extended our Gaussian process model (Model 1), to capture the assumption that each
point belongs to one of an unknown number of underlying relationships. Clearly, there is no fixed
bound on the number of relationships that might obtain between x and y, but one would expect that
fewer relationships should be more plausible than more, as a matter of simplicity or
parsimony (Chater & Vitanyi, 2003). There are multiple ways to express this intuition formally, but
one obvious choice is to allow points to be divided into arbitrary partitions, assigning each partition
a probability using a Chinese Restaurant Process prior (Aldous, 1985), which has previously been
used in rational analyses of categorization (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010).
Under this prior, the likelihood that a new (x, y) pair will be assigned to an existing
relationship is proportional to the number of other points that participate in that relationship, and
the likelihood that it will be assigned to a new relationship is proportional to a parameter α. More
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precisely, the probability that the ith point’s relationship ri will be k is
Pr(ri = k) =

nk
i+ α if nk > 0,
α
i+ α if nk = 0
(8)
where nk is the number of points already participating in relationship k. The likelihood of the data
under a given partition is determined by how likely the ensemble of y values is, given the nature of
the relationships they participate in and their corresponding x values. This conceptually
straightforward extension from Gaussian processes to a mixture of Gaussian processes will be
called Model 2. We might also wish the capture the intuition that (x, y) pairs that have similar x
values are more likely to participate in the same relationships – in other words, relationships tend to
be locally smooth and unimodal. This expectation can be built into the model by assuming that the
likelihood that a point belongs to a partition is determined in part by its closeness to current
members, represented using the x-value’s likelihood under a Gaussian distribution based on
existing members. This last model, Model 3, is an example of a mixture of experts (Jacobs, Jordan,
Nowlan, & Hinton, 1991; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Kalish et al., 2004), an approach that has
been applied to Gaussian processes in the past (Rasmussen & Ghahramani, 2002; Meeds &
Osindero, 2006). As with Model 1, Models 2 and 3 can be interpreted in terms of Bayesian linear
regression or Gaussian processes, where every Gaussian process kernel for every expert can be
represented as a linear regression model, albeit, as before, with a potentially infinite number of
features. See Figure 6 for samples of the kinds of relationships that the mixture of Gaussian process
experts (henceforth Model 3) favors.
Knowledge partitioning
Before applying Models 2 and 3 to knowledge partitioning phenomena, we evaluated them
against the same difficulty-of-learning and extrapolation results with which we assessed our
original Gaussian process models. As with the earlier models, we used the same parameters for all
of the experiments, and obtained close fits to human judgments, summarized in Tables 1 and 2 (see
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Figure 6. Samples from Model 3. The left plots show samples drawn from an infinite mixture of
experts with α = .1, favoring a small number of distinct relationships. The right plots show
samples drawn from a mixture with α = 10, favoring a large number of distinct relationships.
Because of the diffuse prior over locations in the x-axis in Model 3, randomly-drawn samples tend
not to concentrate in x and thus look similar to samples drawn from Model 2.
Appendix B for details of parameters and fits). We also plotted predictions for Model 3 against
mean human judgments in the extrapolation experiments in Figure 5. In general, Models 2 and 3
performed as well as any other model, and better than the majority of the alternatives.
To gauge the extent to which the models’ predictions are consistent with knowledge
partitioning phenomena, we obtained individual predictions from twelve participants in Kalish et
al.’s (2004) studies, four per experiment.3 Each experiment included training points and
interpolation regions that were designed to elicit multiple modes in y for a given x. For example, in
Experiment 1, there was a gap between two partial linear functions with the same slope and
different intercepts. Many participants made judgments in the gap that matched both functions,
3The full data set was not available, but the combined distribution of judgments for the 12 participants was consistent
with the overall distribution reported in Kalish et al. (2004).
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leaving a bimodal response distribution. Like Kalish et al., we focus on showing that our model
captures the bimodal responses of the participants, and gives a posterior distribution that matches
the distribution of actual judgments.
The results are summarized in Figure 7, comparing Models’ 1, 2, and 3 predicted
probabilities of different y values to those given by participants. Model 1 predicts the aggregate
trend in Kalish et al.’s Experiment 1, but cannot explain the discontinuities exhibited by two of the
participants shown in Figure 1) or the multiple modes evident in participants’ judgments for
Experiments 2 and 3. In contrast, Models 2 and 3 predict the multiple relationships will be inferred.
Model 3, being sensitive to the proximity of points, is more likely than Model 2 to group points into
local relationships, as is apparent in its predictions for Experiment 1. We used a single prior
distribution across the different experiments and participants, but the individual differences in
Figure 1 are readily explained in terms of different participants having different inductive biases.
Future work, with more extensive within-subjects data, would permit us to test our model as a
framework for understanding how inductive biases vary between individuals.
Iterated learning
As a final measure of Gaussian process models of function learning, we compared their
predictions to human judgments in the iterated learning experiments of Kalish et al. (2007). As
mentioned earlier, iterated learning designs involve a chain of learners in which each individual
observes data, makes inferences from those data, and uses those inferences to provide data to the
next learner in the chain. For function learning specifically, each observation is an (x, y) pair, and
the data that a learner passes forward is a subset of his or her y-predictions for new x-values.
Ideally, these judgments would reflect samples from the inferred underlying function, with variance
attributable only to uncertainty about that function, and, potentially, inferred noise around that
function. In practice, however, participants’ judgments are subject to errors in perception and in
recording their judgments, as well as varying degrees of motivation and attention. Rather than
attempting to model these factors – which are underdetermined – we chose to apply our
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Figure 7. Plots comparing human judgments in Experiments 1-3 of Kalish et al., (2004) to the
predictions of Models 1, 2, and 3. The points represent individual human judgments, aggregated
over four individuals for whom data were available, while the colors represent log probability
densities, with hotter colors representing higher probabilities.
mixture-of-experts model to the same tasks that human faced as-is, looking for the same qualitative
patterns that human learners demonstrated. As in Kalish et al.’s experiments, we ran chains in
which the first iteration’s observations, or the initial data, were drawn from four functions,
including positive linear, negative linear, U-shaped, and random functions. For each subsequent
round, the model used 50 predictions generated from the previous round, like the human learners.
The human learners’ judgments revealed several broad patterns, shown in Figure 2, which we
used as the basis for our evaluation, including: (1) given positive linear initial data, judgments were
consistently positive linear over successive rounds; (2) a shift toward positive linear functions for
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the negative linear, U-shaped, and random initial data, with transitional states reflecting uncertainty
or inferences to high noise or multiple overlapping relationships – in almost all chains, there are
intermediate states that deviate from any simple, well-formed function; and (3) greater stability and
slower transitions in the negative linear case than in the U-shaped and random cases.
Figure 3III shows that Model 3 demonstrates each of these features. Like many human
learners and the POLE and EXAM models (Figure 3I and II), it preserved positive linear
relationships, with small deviations from a 0-intercept 1-slope relationship that are due to our
treatment of out-of-range samples: when the model samples y values that are greater than 1 or less
than 0, those values are resampled, leading to a slight flattening of the slope. A policy of converting
out-of-range samples by replacing them with the most extreme value would reduce this effect. Like
human chains and the POLE model’s predictions, but not EXAM’s, iterations following U-shaped
initial data included cases of overlapping positive and negative relationships. Like several human
learners, random initial data led to the GP model to offer overlapping, weakly sloped linear
relationships before shifting towards a single positive linear relationship. Finally, like human
learners, the GP model tended to preserve the negative linear relationships more than U-shaped and
disordered relationships. The most salient difference between the GP Model 3 and human learners
is its slower convergence to positive linear relationships.
There are several ways in which we might account for this difference in convergence rates.
First, our priors over types of relationships were not fitted to human behavior, and one more
strongly favoring positive linear relationships – or a lower variance in the distribution of slopes –
would naturally lead to faster convergence. Second, a more nuanced view of noise would be
consistent with the differences in convergence rates. For example, our model assigns a very low
probability to “random” relationships, in which points have very high variance, whereas
participants might expect that some points are anomalies, analogous to equipment failures. Third,
the rapid convergence of human chains might be explained in part by differences between
individual human learners. For example, specific individuals might have stronger expectations that
relationships are positive and linear, and believe more strongly that their observations are only noisy
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reflections of the underlying relationship. As with individual differences in knowledge partitioning,
all of these possibilities could be explored using within-subjects data.
General Discussion
Function learning is one of the core inductive problems that we encounter every day, arising
whenever we need to learn the relationship between two continuous variables. Models of function
learning have explained the human ability to solve this problem in terms of different cognitive
mechanisms, such as inducing rules or generalizing on the basis of similarity. We have shown that
these different cognitive mechanisms correspond to different strategies for solving the abstract
computational problem of regression, and that both can be expressed as special cases of a Bayesian
solution to this problem based on Gaussian processes. This perspective helps to reveal the
commonalities between these different mechanisms, and to define models that combine their
strengths. The resulting models provide a good fit to human data, performing similarly to the best
mechanistic accounts, and provide a way to transparently identify the inductive biases that guide
human learners in function learning tasks.
In our introduction, we stated that our model is intended to complement, rather than replace,
existing accounts of function learning: we focus on the inductive biases that shape function
learning, rather that the processes by which it occurs. In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss
the relationship between these levels of analysis, the project of identifying human inductive biases,
and some of the ways in which our work could be extended.
The roles of models at different levels of analysis
Our focus in this paper has been on understanding human function learning by identifying the
underlying computational problem and the assumptions that seem to yield parallels between
optimal solutions to this problem and human behavior. This approach is in the spirit of the approach
of rational analysis laid out by Anderson (1990), yielding an explanation of behavior that lies at
what Marr (1982) termed the “computational level”. The results of this investigation are quite
different from those yielded by a more traditional modeling approach operating at what Marr (1982)
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termed the “algorithmic level” and focusing on identifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying
human behavior. The previous models of function learning we have discussed in this paper are
defined at this level, making claims about the aspects of human memory and reasoning that
contribute to their performance on function learning tasks.
The focus on the computational level establishes a clear set of goals for our model. First, we
are not trying to define the single best model of human performance on function learning tasks,
because our computational-level model is not in competition with algorithmic-level models. It is
entirely possible for our computational-level analysis to be correct, and for it to be executed at the
algorithmic level by cognitive mechanisms that resemble existing psychological process models. In
this case, we would expect both kinds of models to fit well (and possibly the process models to fit
better, since they will capture idiosyncrasies of behavior due to the way in which the
computational-level solution is carried out). Our goal is to show that the computational-level
solution we have proposed does a good job of capturing human behavior, and existing
algorithmic-level models provide a good yardstick against which to measure this performance.
Second, a key part of our contribution is theoretical. We have shown that algorithmic-level
mechanisms that seem quite different can in fact be captured in a single theoretical framework at
the computational level, and that this leads to new ways of thinking about combining the strengths
of these approaches. This kind of contribution has a precedent in other work examining aspects of
cognition at different levels of analysis: Ashby and Alfonso-Reese (1995) showed that exemplar
and prototype models of categorization could both be viewed as strategies for solving the problem
of density estimation that arises when categorization is viewed from the perspective of Bayesian
inference. This demonstration of a common underlying computational-level problem (and
connections to ideas in statistics) provides the foundation for recent work on rational models of
categorization that can interpolate between exemplar and prototype representations (Sanborn et al.,
2010). We view our analysis as making a similar contribution for the case of function learning,
providing an explicit link between existing cognitive models and ideas from statistics that leads to
new ways of understanding human behavior. A probabilistic approach also provides a basis for
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understanding a broader range of phenomena, including not just patterns of interpolation and
extrapolation judgments. For example, one can use explain the influence by linguistic and
contextual information on function learning (Byun, 1995) in terms of priors, and understand people
search for new information (Borji & Itti, 2013) or benefit from different kinds of
instruction (Lindsey, Mozer, Huggins, & Pashler, 2013).
Capturing human inductive biases
In inductive problems, such as function learning, the right answer is underdetermined by the
available data. This means that doing a good job of solving the problem requires having good
inductive biases – those factors other than the data that lead a learner to favor one hypothesis over
another (Mitchell, 1997). When viewed from the abstract computational level, the key challenge in
explaining human inductive inference is characterizing our inductive biases. Bayesian models of
cognition make this task particularly clear, as the inductive biases of these models are expressed
through the choice of hypothesis space and the prior on hypotheses.
In function learning, the characterization of the inductive biases of a learner is particularly
clear: it corresponds to a prior distribution on functions. As we have discussed, defining a prior
distribution on functions is challenging, since there are uncountably many possible functions,
dependent on an unbounded number of latent variables. The Gaussian process models we have
explored provide a succinct way of expressing priors on functions that is nonetheless extremely
flexible in the range of distributions that it allows, and thus provide a powerful tool for exploring
human inductive biases for function learning. We can express the assumptions behind this prior in
terms of a kernel function, which captures the similarity between stimuli, in terms of a set of basis
functions, which express a representation of these stimuli, or through samples from the resulting
distribution over functions, providing three different ways to indicate the inductive biases that a
learner has.
Being able to characterize human inductive biases in terms of a probability distribution over
functions also makes it straightforward to make automated learning systems that are guided by the
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same inductive biases. We can easily take the prior assumed by our Gaussian process models and
use it as a component of Gaussian process models used in machine learning or statistics. This
provides a natural bridge between human and machine learning, and an opportunity to explore
whether using human inductive biases improves the operation of automated systems as well as to
develop automated systems that make inferences that are more comprehensible to human users.
Limitations and future directions
The models we have explored cover a wide range of results from the literature on human
function learning, but there are still phenomena that they cannot capture and aspects of human
performance that lie outside the considerations that normally inform a computational-level analysis.
Addressing these limitations creates some interesting directions for future work.
A basic omission in the formulation of our model is that it is unable to learn cyclic functions.
Since these functions are learnable by people (although with significant difficulty Bott & Heit,
2004; Byun, 1995), this is a weakness that should be addressed. It is straightforward to incorporate
a capacity to learn cyclic functions by including a periodic kernel in the mixture of kernels.
Incorporation of this additional kernel – with an appropriately low mixture weight – would not
change the predictions of the model for non-cyclic functions appreciably. We judged the
corresponding increase in the complexity of the model to outweigh the value of capturing these
additional phenomena.
The fact that people can learn cyclic functions raises another interesting question: Can we
build an exhaustive summary of the kinds of relationships that people can learn? In the context of
our models, this becomes a question of what kinds of functions have support in people’s prior
distributions, or what set of kernels should be included in the mixture. Existing results support the
inclusion of a relatively small set of kernels – essentially, those that we consider plus a periodic
kernel for cyclic functions.
Another issue, also related to our prior over kernels, is that we chose a distribution strongly
favoring linear relationships. Is this prior consistent with the idea that a rational analysis should use
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diffuse priors that capture the statistical structure of the environment (Anderson, 1990)? It is a
shortcoming of the current work that we cannot be certain, but we believe that a linearity-biased
prior is better than alternatives. In function learning, it is not realistic to directly measure the
statistical structure of the environment, i.e., what functions are truly more or less common: doing so
would depend on knowing what combinations of variables are salient to human observers over long
periods of time, including, perhaps, our evolutionary history. Further, any census of functions
would reflect the cognitive and attentional biases of the people who would conduct it. In the
absence of ground truth about the frequencies of functions, we believe that the best approach is to
look at what relationships people think are more common, using both direct and indirect measures.
Previous studies, including many that we have not evaluated here (see Busemeyer et al.,1997 for a
summary, and Little and Shiffrin, for evidence that people infer linear relationships given very noisy
data) support the idea that linear relationships are thought to be more common. Among these are
results showing that people say that linear relationships occur much more frequently than
non-linear ones, and showing that people tend to offer linear relationships when prompted in the
absence of data or informative context (Brehmer, 1974). Even if we set aside these results, it seems
a case can be made that linear functions are indeed very common in situations the matter to humans.
Under usual (e.g., non-relativistic) conditions, relationships between mass, force, acceleration,
velocity, distance, and time can be expressed as collections of linear relationships, and many
physical objects have broadly similar shapes at different scales, implying that an object’s height is a
roughly linear function of its width, for example.
Our focus on the abstract computational-level problem underlying function learning and the
nature of ideal solutions to that problem means that there are aspects of human performance that
our models cannot capture. For example, our models assume that people have perfect memory for
the stimuli and exact recall of the values of the variables presented on each trial.These assumptions
are clearly false, and a more realistic treatment of memory and perception might make it possible to
tease apart the assumptions in our model that are due to these factors (e.g., high noise parameters)
from those that capture human inductive inference (e.g., the set of kernels appearing in the mixture).
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There are going to be aspects of human performance that cannot be captured by the kind of
computational-level models we have considered, such as sensitivity to the order in which stimuli
are presented, that may be candidates for identifying algorithmic-level implementations of these
ideal solutions (similar to the role of order effects in categorization Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al.,
2010). As a starting place, it may be worth drawing inspiration from efforts to overcome the
difficulty of scaling Gaussian processes to large data sets in the face of limited memory (e.g.
Hensman, Fusi, & Lawrence, 2013).
If future work is to provide a deeper understanding of function learning, including the roles
played by priors (and free parameters more generally), learners’ limited cognitive resources, and
individual differences, it will be necessary to go beyond the evaluation methods that have become
standard in function learning, in at least two respects. First, it is now increasingly feasible and
important to examine not just overall error rates, or aggregate correlations between model
predictions and human judgments, but the accuracy with which a model can predict human
judgments for individual points, given the values and order of previous training and test points. In
addition to making it possible to assess how well a model can account for the process and dynamics
of function learning – which include order effects as described above, as well as other phenomena,
like the tacit belief that a relationship might be changing over time or trials (Speekenbrink &
Shanks, 2010) – such an approach is more robust to aggregation artifacts (Navarro, Griffiths,
Steyvers, & Lee, 2006). Second, we have taken a common approach to fitting and testing cognitive
models – finding global parameters or priors that give low error or a high likelihood of the
experimental data – but this approach has drawbacks beyond the simple risk of overfitting. Perhaps
the most serious of these, in cases where we are interested in the priors that people tacitly use, is
that this approach licenses only coarse-grained conclusions about what priors are likely or plausible
given the experimental data. In the future, we hope that cheaper computational resources and
increasingly efficient algorithms will make it feasible to conduct a Bayesian analysis of our model
and others, which would provide a clearer picture of the priors that are consistent with group-level
tendencies as well as individual differences (Hemmer, Tauber, & Steyvers, 2014).
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Finally, a key question for any Bayesian model of cognition is the origins of the inductive
biases that are expressed in the prior distribution. Having established a picture of adult inductive
biases at the start of an experiment, we can begin to explore questions related to the development of
these inductive biases. Within the Bayesian framework, it is possible to make inferences at the level
of prior distributions by using hierarchical Bayesian models (Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006).
In the case of our Gaussian process model, people could learn the set of kernels or parameter
distributions for flexible kernel types (for work related to these ideas, see Wilson & Adams, 2013;
Duvenaud, Lloyd, Grosse, Tenenbaum, & Ghahramani, 2013), the probabilities assigned to those
kernels, and other parameters of the model. The predictions of this account of the origins of human
inductive biases for function learning can be evaluated by comparing the performance of children
and adults in function learning tasks and conducting transfer learning experiments examining how
people’s inductive biases change through experience, and is an exciting direction for future
research.
Conclusion
We have presented a rational account of human function learning, drawing on ideas from
machine learning and statistics to show that the two approaches that have dominated previous work
– rules and similarity – can be interpreted as two views of the same kind of optimal solution to this
problem. Our Gaussian process models combine the strengths of both approaches, using a mixture
of kernels to allow systematic extrapolation as well as sensitive non-linear interpolation. Tests of
the performance of this model on benchmark datasets show that it can capture some of the basic
phenomena of human function learning, and is competitive with existing process models. The result
is a clear characterization of human inductive biases for function learning, and a new set of links
between human learning and ideas in statistics and machine learning.
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 40
References
Aldous, D. (1985). Exchangeability and related topics. In École d’été de probabilités de
Saint-Flour, XIII—1983 (pp. 1–198). Berlin: Springer.
Anderson, J. R. (1990). The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Anderson, J. R. (1991). The adaptive nature of human categorization. Psychological Review, 98(3),
409–429.
Ashby, F. G., & Alfonso-Reese, L. A. (1995). Categorization as probability density estimation.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 39, 216-233.
Bernardo, J. M., & Smith, A. F. M. (1994). Bayesian theory. New York: Wiley.
Borji, A., & Itti, L. (2013). Bayesian optimization explains human active search. In C. Burges,
L. Bottou, M. Welling, Z. Ghahramani, & K. Weinberger (Eds.), Advances in
neural information processing systems 26 (pp. 55–63). Curran Associates, Inc. Retrieved from
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/4952-bayesian-optimization-explains-human-active-search.pdf
Bott, L., & Heit, E. (2004). Nonmonotonic extrapolation in function learning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30(1).
Brehmer, B. (1971). Subjects’ ability to use functional rules. Psychonomic Science, 24, 259-260.
Brehmer, B. (1974). Hypotheses about relations between scaled variables in the learning of
probabilistic inference tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 11,
1-27.
Brehmer, B. (1976). Subjects’ ability to find the parameters of functional rules in probabilistic
inference tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 17(2), 388–397.
Brehmer, B., Alm, H., & Warg, L. (1985). Learning and hypothesis testing in probabilistic
inference tasks. Scandinavian journal of psychology, 26(1), 305–313.
Busemeyer, J. R., Byun, E., DeLosh, E. L., & McDaniel, M. A. (1997). Learning functional
relations based on experience with input-output pairs by humans and artificial neural
networks. In K. Lamberts & D. Shanks (Eds.), Concepts and categories (p. 405-437).
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 41
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Byun, E. (1995). Interaction between prior knowledge and type of nonlinear relationship on
function learning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Purdue University.
Carroll, J. (1963). Functional learning: The learning of continuous functional mappings relating
stimulus and response continua. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.
Chater, N., & Vitanyi, P. (2003). Simplicity: a unifying principle in cognitive science. Trends in
Cognitive Science, 7, 19-22.
DeLosh, E. L., Busemeyer, J. R., & McDaniel, M. A. (1997). Extrapolation: The sine qua non of
abstraction in function learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 23, 968-986.
Duvenaud, D., Lloyd, J. R., Grosse, R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Ghahramani, Z. (2013). Structure
discovery in nonparametric regression through compositional kernel search. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1302.4922.
Erickson, M., & Kruschke, J. (1998). Rules and exemplars in category learning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 127(2), 107.
Gelman, A., Carlin, J., Stern, H., & Rubin, D. (2004). Bayesian data analysis. CRC press.
Gilks, W., Richardson, S., & Spiegelhalter, D. J. (Eds.). (1996). Markov chain Monte Carlo in
practice. Suffolk, UK: Chapman and Hall.
Griffiths, T. L., Lucas, C. G., Williams, J. J., & Kalish, M. L. (2009). Modeling human function
learning with Gaussian processes. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 21.
Griffiths, T. L., Vul, E., & Sanborn, A. (2012). Bridging levels of analysis for probabilistic models
of cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(4), 263–268.
Hemmer, P., Tauber, S., & Steyvers, M. (2014). Moving beyond qualitative evaluations of bayesian
models of cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 1–15.
Hensman, J., Fusi, N., & Lawrence, N. D. (2013). Gaussian processes for big data. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1309.6835.
Jacobs, R., Jordan, M., Nowlan, S., & Hinton, G. (1991). Adaptive mixtures of local experts.
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 42
Neural computation, 3(1), 79–87.
Kalish, M. L. (2013). Learning and extrapolating a periodic function. Memory & cognition, 41(6),
886–896.
Kalish, M. L., Griffiths, T. L., & Lewandowsky, S. (2007). Iterated learning: Intergenerational
knowledge transmission reveals inductive biases. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.
Kalish, M. L., Lewandowsky, S., & Kruschke, J. (2004). Population of linear experts: Knowledge
partitioning and function learning. Psychological Review, 111, 1072-1099.
Kirby, S. (2001). Spontaneous evolution of linguistic structure: An iterated learning model of the
emergence of regularity and irregularity. IEEE Journal of Evolutionary Computation, 5,
102-110.
Koh, K., & Meyer, D. (1991). Function learning: Induction of continuous stimulus-response
relations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17(5),
811–836.
Kwantes, P., & Neal, A. (2006). Why people underestimate y when extrapolating in linear functions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(5), 1019.
Lewandowsky, S. L., Kalish, M. L., & Ngang, S. K. (2002). Simplified learning in complex
situations: Knowledge partitioning in human learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 131, 163-193.
Lindsey, R. V., Mozer, M. C., Huggins, W. J., & Pashler, H. (2013). Optimizing instructional
policies. In C. Burges, L. Bottou, M. Welling, Z. Ghahramani, & K. Weinberger (Eds.),
Advances in neural information processing systems 26 (pp. 2778–2786). Curran Associates,
Inc. Retrieved from
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/4887-optimizing-instructional-policies.pdf
Little, D. R., & Shiffrin, R. M. (2009). Simplicity bias in the estimation of causal functions. In
Proceedings of the thirty-first annual conference of the cognitive science society (pp.
1157–1162).
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 43
Lucas, C. G., Sterling, D. J., & Kemp, C. (2012). Superspace extrapolation reveals inductive biases
in function learning. In N. Miyake, D. Peebles, & R. P. Cooper (Eds.), Proceedings of the
34th annual conference of the cognitive science society. Cognitive Science Society.
MacKay, D. (1995). Probable networks and plausible predictions - a review of practical bayesian
methods for supervised neural networks. Network: Computation in Neural Systems, 6,
469-505.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
McDaniel, M., & Busemeyer, J. (2005). The conceptual basis of function learning and
extrapolation: Comparison of rule-based and associative-based models. Psychonomic bulletin
& review, 12(1), 24.
McDaniel, M., Dimperio, E., Griego, J., & Busemeyer, J. (2009). Predicting transfer performance:
A comparison of competing function learning models. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(1), 173.
Meeds, E., & Osindero, S. (2006). An alternative infinite mixture of gaussian process experts. In
Y. Weiss, B. Schölkopf, & J. Platt (Eds.), Advances in neural information processing systems
18 (pp. 883–890). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Minh, H., Niyogi, P., & Yao, Y. (2006). MercerâA˘Z´s theorem, feature maps, and smoothing.
Learning theory, 154–168.
Mitchell, T. M. (1997). Machine learning. New York: McGraw Hill.
Navarro, D. J., Griffiths, T. L., Steyvers, M., & Lee, M. D. (2006). Modeling individual differences
using dirichlet processes. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 50, 101-122.
Neal, R. M. (1994). Priors for infinite networks (Tech. Rep.). Technical Report CRG-TR-94-1,
Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, 1994.
Neal, R. M. (1998). Markov chain sampling methods for Dirichlet process mixture models (Tech.
Rep. No. 9815). Department of Statistics, University of Toronto.
Rasmussen, C. E., & Ghahramani, Z. (2002). Infinite mixtures of gaussian process experts. In
T. Dietterich, S. Becker, & Z. Ghahramani (Eds.), Advances in neural information processing
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 44
systems 14 (pp. 881–888). MIT Press.
Rasmussen, C. E., & Williams, C. K. I. (2006). Gaussian processes for machine learning. MIT
Press.
Sanborn, A. N., Griffiths, T. L., & Navarro, D. J. (2010). Rational approximations to rational
models: alternative algorithms for category learning. Psychological Review, 117(4), 1144.
Shepard, R. N. (1987). Towards a universal law of generalization for psychological science.
Science, 237, 1317-1323.
Speekenbrink, M., & Shanks, D. R. (2010). Learning in a changing environment. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 139(2), 266.
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive
learning and reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 10, 309-318.
Williams, C. K. I. (1998). Prediction with gaussian processes: From linear regression to linear
prediction and beyond. In M. I. Jordan (Ed.), Learning in graphical models (p. 599-621).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wilson, A. G., & Adams, R. P. (2013). Gaussian process covariance kernels for pattern discovery
and extrapolation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1302.4245.
A RATIONAL MODEL OF FUNCTION LEARNING 45
Appendix A
Equivalence of Bayesian linear regression and Gaussian processes
This appendix contains a more detailed description of how Bayesian linear regression can be
expressed using Gaussian processes, showing first that Bayesian linear regression with normal
priors on coefficients can be represented as a mean function and a covariance function relating
observed and predicted y values. Next we show that such a representation – which describes a
Gaussian process – can be used for prediction directly, setting aside the linear regression
interpretation.
Bayesian linear regression
In Bayesian linear regression, the goal is to use n observed x-values, xn = (x1, ..., xn), and
their corresponding y-values with added noise, tn = (t1, ..., tn), to predict yn+1 from xn+1. Let the
hypothesis space include linear functions of the form y = b0 + b1x, where the prior probability of a
given function is a multivariate Gaussian distribution on b = (b0, b1) with mean zero and
covariance Σb. Applying Equation 1 then results in a multivariate Gaussian posterior distribution on
b (see Bernardo & Smith, 1994) with
E[b|xn, tn] = (σ2tΣ−1b + XTnXn)−1XTntn (9)
cov[b|xn] = (Σ−1b +
1
σ2t
XTnXn)−1 (10)
where Xn = [1nxn] (i.e., a matrix with a vector of ones horizontally concatenated with xn+1) Since
yn+1 is simply a linear function of b, applying Equation 2 yields a Gaussian predictive distribution,
with yn+1 having mean [1 xn+1]E[b|xn, tn] and variance [1 xn+1]cov[b|xn][1 xn+1]T . The
predictive distribution for tn+1 is similar, but with the addition of σ2t to the variance.
In the more general case where y is a function of an arbitrary number of basis functions
φ(1), ..., φ(k) of x, the same result holds, substituting Φ = [1n φ(1)(xn) ... φ(k)(xn)] for X and
[1 φ(1)(xn+1) ... φ(k)(xn+1)] for [1 xn+1], where φ(xn) = [φ(x1) ... φ(xn)]T .
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Gaussian processes
The Gaussian process approach amounts to predicting y using x by defining a joint Gaussian
distribution on yn+1 given xn+1 and conditioning on yn, with covariance matrix
Kn+1 =
 Kn kn,n+1
kTn,n+1 kn+1
 (11)
where Kn depends on the values of xn, kn,n+1 depends on xn and xn+1, and kn+1 depends only on
xn+1. If we condition on yn, the distribution of yn+1 is Gaussian with mean kTn,n+1K−1n y and
variance kn+1 − kTn,n+1K−1n kn,n+1. This approach to prediction uses a Gaussian process, a
stochastic process that induces a Gaussian distribution on y based on the values of x. We can extend
this approach to predict yn+1 from xn+1, tn, and xn by adding σ2t In to Kn, where In is the n× n
identity matrix, to take into account the additional variance associated with the observations tn.
The covariance matrix Kn+1 is specified using a two-place function in x known as a kernel,
with Kij = K(xi, xj). Any kernel that results in an appropriate (symmetric, positive-definite)
covariance matrix for all x can be used. Common kinds of kernels include radial basis functions,
e.g.,
K(xi, xj) = θ21 exp(−
1
θ22
(xi − xj)2) (12)
with values of y for which values of x are close being correlated, and periodic functions, e.g.,
K(xi, xj) = θ23 exp(θ24(cos(
2pi
θ5
[xi − xj]))) (13)
indicating that values of y for which values of x are close relative to the period θ3 are likely to be
highly correlated. Gaussian processes thus provide a flexible approach to prediction, with the kernel
defining which values of x are likely to have similar values of y.
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Appendix B
Priors and parameters
The Gaussian process model makes use of two kinds of prior distributions: priors over different
types kernels, and priors over the parameters of the individual kernel functions. The prior over
kernels reflects past results showing that people act in a manner consistent with the assumption that
positive linear relationships as more likely than negative linear relationships, which are more likely
than quadratic relationships, which are in turn more likely than arbitrary non-linear relationships
(Brehmer, 1974).
In previous experiments designed to reveal prior beliefs about the prevalence of different
kinds of relationships (Kalish et al., 2007), positive linear relationships are approximately 8 times
as likely as negative linear relationships, but fewer specifics are available for the rates at which
people generate other relationships, beyond the qualitative ordering described by Busemeyer et al
(Busemeyer et al., 1997). As a result, we choose prior probabilities proportional to 8,1, 0.1, and
0.01 for positive linear, negative linear, quadratic, and radial basis kernels.
The parameters for the kernels were given gamma distributed priors, and included the
variances of the weights and intercept for the linear and quadratic kernels, the height and distance
parameters for the radial basis kernel. In all of these cases, the gamma distribution had a shape
parameter of 1.001, which had the effect of discounting values very close to zero. All of the scale
parameters were set to one, except for the radial basis function’s width, or smoothness.
As discussed in the body text, Models 2 and 3, which are mixtures of Gaussian processes and
mixtures of Gaussian process experts, respectively, also included a parameter α determining how
dispersed points were expected to be over distinct experts. For Model 3, the prior over x for each
expert was specified by assuming two virtual points at the extremes of the x range, and had no free
parameters.
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Model fitting
For the fitted parameters, we considered combinations of σ2t ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2},
α ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10}, and θl ∈ {1, 10}, where σ2t is the variance of points around their true
function, α is the dispersion parameter for the Chinese Restaurant Process prior on partitions, and
θl controls the smoothness of functions under the radial basis kernel. In all cases, we used
parameters that maximized the mean correlation between model predictions and mean human
judgments across the difficulty-of-learning and extrapolation data. The remaining parameters, for
variances for non-noise terms and the radial basis function’s height scale, were all fixed at 1.
Separate fits were obtained for the POLE data. See Table B1 for the values that were applied to the
interpolation and extrapolation experiments, and Table B2 for the values that were applied to the
knowledge partitioning and iterated learning experiments.
Table B1
Model Parameters for Interpolation and Extrapolation Phenomena.
σ2t θl α
Model 1, Linear 0.01 NA NA
Model 1, Quadratic 0.01 NA NA
Model 1, Radial-basis 0.10 1 NA
Model 1, LQ 0.01 NA NA
Model 1, LR 0.10 1 NA
Model 1, RQ 0.10 1 NA
Model 1, LRQ 0.05 10 NA
Model 2 0.01 10 1.00
Model 3 0.01 10 1.00
Note: Model 1 kernels included combinations of linear (L), quadratic (Q), and radial basis functions
(R).
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Table B2
Model Parameters for Iterated Learning and Knowledge Partitioning Phenomena.
σ2t θl α
Model 1 0.2 10 NA
Model 2 0.001 10 10
Model 3 0.001 10 10
Note: Only models incorporating all kernels were considered.
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Appendix C
Inference
This appendix describes the procedures by which we obtained predictions for each of our models.
Gaussian process model (Model 1)
To obtain predictions, we performed probabilistic inference using a Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for an introduction, see Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter (1996).
This algorithm defines a Markov chain for which the stationary distribution is the distribution from
which we wish to sample. In our case, this is the posterior distribution over types and the
hyperparameters for the kernels θ given the observations x and t. The hyperparameters include all
kernel parameters discussed above and the noise in the observations σ2t . Our MCMC algorithm
repeats two steps. The first step is sampling the type of function conditioned on x, t, and the
current value of θ, with the probability of each type being proportional to the product of p(tn|xn)
for the corresponding Gaussian process and the prior probability of that type as given by pi. The
second step is sampling the value of θ given xn, tn, and the current type, which is done using a
Metropolis-Hastings procedure, proposing a value for θ from a Gaussian distribution centered on
the current value and deciding whether to accept that value based on the product of the probability
it assigns to tn given xn and the prior p(θ). In all cases, this inference procedure was iterated 8000
times.
Mixtures of Gaussian process experts (Models 2 and 3)
The infinite mixture of Gaussian process model extends the basic model by assigning
observations to different experts, or Gaussian processes. The prior probability that an observation
will be assigned to a particular expert is determined by a Chinese restaurant process (CRP) prior,
where the probability that a new point will be assigned to an expert is proportional to the number of
points already assigned to it, and the probability that a point will be assigned to a new expert is
determined by α: if expert k has nk points of a total N assigned points, a new point will be
assigned to it with probability nk
N+α , and to a new table with probability
α
N+α . For Model 3, the
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locations of points in x also influence the experts to which they are assigned: each expert is
assumed to have a Gaussian distribution over x values with a minimally informative prior, defined
by combining improper constant priors for the mean and variance with two virtual points at 0 and 1,
the extremes of the range of x. This prior leads to a t-distributed density for new points, conditional
on those already assigned to the expert (for details, see Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004).
The first steps of the inference procedure are identical to those used for Model 1. These are
followed by Gibbs sampling for the assignments of points to experts, resampling each point and
assigning it to a new or existing expert according to its conditional probability under that expert
given all other points and all parameters (Neal, 1998). Simulated annealing was used to speed
mixing of the sampling chains, which included 8000 iterations of each step.
